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1 Introduction
Sequential stopping rules are often used in clinical trials to address efficiency and ethical issues that
arise in human experimentation. Group sequential stopping rules which maintain desired frequentist
operating characteristics (e.g., type I and II error rates) were first described for situations in which
early termination of the clinical trial was considered when interim results were so extreme as
to suggest a beneficial effect of a new treatment.[1, 2] However, it is now also quite common for
clinical trialists to choose stopping rules which allow for early stopping when all clinically important
beneficial treatment effects have been credibly eliminated. Such boundaries are often referred to
as “futility” boundaries, because they are meant to identify those settings in which it is futile to
continue the clinical trial: The results of the clinical trial are unlikely to lead to adoption of the
new therapy, and no further useful information will be obtained by continuing the study.
The statistical and clinical trials methodology literature is replete with alternative criteria to
be used for the specification of a stopping rule, including stopping boundaries defined for the
efficient score [3, 4, 5], normalized Z statistic and/or fixed sample P value [1, 6], crude estimate
of the treatment effect [7], error spending functions [8, 9], Bayesian posterior probabilities [10, 11],
conditional power [12, 13], and predictive power [14]. In companion papers to this manuscript,
we have discussed the 1:1 correspondence between these various stopping boundary scales, arguing
that the criterion used to define a stopping boundary is less important than the evaluation of the
frequentist [15] and Bayesian [16] operating characteristics associated with it. In neither of those
papers, however, did we address the evaluation of the stochastic curtailment measures of conditional
and predictive power. This omission was purposeful.
When collaborating on a sequential clinical trial design, we often find that some of our collab-
orators will ask questions related to whether a trial stopped early with one decision would have
proceeded to the opposite conclusion at the final analysis. When computed in the setting of early
stopping with a failure to reject the null hypothesis, the probability of such a reversal of decisions
is often regarded as a measure of the “futility” of continuing the trial: If there is only a low prob-
ability that the trial would obtain results allowing rejection of the null hypothesis, then it might
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seem futile to continue collecting data.
Our response to such questions is to demonstrate the conflicting answers that arise from the
varied approaches to stochastic curtailment: conditional power under different hypotheses and
predictive power under different priors. We then discuss the foundational inconsistencies with
stochastic curtailment measures under either frequentist or Bayesian paradigms and present al-
ternative measures of the “futility” of continuing a clinical trial based on the tradeoffs between
unconditional power and average sample size. It has been our experience that no given group of
collaborators has ever again asked about stochastic curtailment measures. In this paper, we amplify
on this presentation in the context of the sepsis clinical trial used as the example in the companion
papers.
In section 2, we provide a brief review of the scientific setting and basic statistical design of
the clinical trial. In section 3 we discuss statistical paradigms which might be used as a basis for
a decision to terminate a clinical trial early. We present the correspondence between stopping rule
thresholds defined for the efficient score, the crude estimate of treatment effect, conditional power,
and predictive power. We then illustrate some of the difficulties that arise when using stochastic
curtailment as a criterion for a stopping rule. We conclude in section 4 with some general comments
regarding the alternatives to stochastic curtailment measures.
2 Example Used for Illustration
We illustrate our approach in the context of a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical
trial of an antibody to endotoxin in the treatment of gram-negative sepsis. Details of the scientific
setting and the clinical trial design are provided in the companion paper [15].
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2.1 Notation and Sample Size
Briefly, a maximum of 1,700 patients with proven gram-negative sepsis were to be randomly assigned
in a 1:1 ratio to receive a single dose of antibody to endotoxin or placebo. The primary endpoint
for the trial was to be the 28 day mortality rate, which was anticipated to be 30% in the placebo
treated patients and was hoped to be 23% in the patients receiving antibody. Notationally, we let
Xki be an indicator that the i-th patient on the k-th treatment arm (k=0 for placebo, k= 1 for
antibody) died in the first 28 days following randomization. Thus Xki = 1 if the i-th patient on
treatment arm k dies in the first 28 days following randomization, and Xki = 0 otherwise. We are
interested in the probability model in which the random variables Xki are independently distributed
according to a Bernoulli distribution B(1, pk), where pk is the unknown 28 day mortality rate on
the k-th treatment arm. We use the difference in 28 day mortality rates θ = p1−p0 as the measure
of treatment effect.
Supposing the accrual of nk subjects on each treatment arm, a frequentist analysis of clinical
trial results would be based on the asymptotic arguments which suggest that pˆk =
∑nk
i=1Xki/nk is
approximately normally distributed with mean pk and variance pk(1 − pk)/nk. We therefore have
an approximate distribution for the estimated treatment effect θˆ = pˆ1 − pˆ0 of
θˆ ∼˙ N
(
θ,
p1(1− p1)
n1
+
p0(1− p0)
n0
)
. (1)
As is customary in the setting of tests of binomial proportions, at the time of data analysis the
actual frequentist test statistic would estimate a common mortality rate pˆ under the null hypothesis
of no treatment effect. Thus, if at the time of data analysis n0 and n1 patients had been accrued to
the placebo and treatment arms, respectively, and the respective observed 28 day mortality rates
were pˆ0 and pˆ1, the statistic used to test the null hypothesis would be
Z =
pˆ1 − pˆ0√
pˆ(1− pˆ)
(
1
n1
+ 1n0
) ,
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where the common mortality rate under the null hypothesis would be estimated by
pˆ =
n1pˆ1 + n0pˆ0
n0 + n1
.
When using probability models in which the statistical information grows in direct proportion
to sample size, standard formulas for sample size calculation describe the interrelationship between
sample size, statistical size and power, and an alternative hypothesis according to
n =
δ2αβV
∆2
, (2)
where n is the sample size on each treatment arm which provides statistical power β to detect a
treatment effect ∆ using a level α hypothesis test. In this formula, V is the variance contributed
by a single sampling unit (e.g., a patient accrued to each of the treatment arms), and δαβ is the
alternative which is detected with statistical power β using a standardized level α trial design (e.g.,
a design appropriate for a study having only one sampling unit accrued).
In the setting of the sepsis trial, ∆ would represent the difference θ = p1−p0 in 28 day mortality
rates, and V = p1(1− p1) + p0(1− p0) would be the contribution to the variance of θˆ from a single
sampling unit consisting of a patient accrued to each treatment arm. In a fixed sample study using
an asymptotically normally distributed test statistic, the standardized alternative for which a one-
sided level α test is detected with statistical power β is δαβ = z1−α + zβ , where zp = Φ
−1(p) is the
p-th quantile of a standard normal distribution having cumulative distribution function Φ(z). Using
this formula and assuming the variability of the estimate under the design alternative hypothesis
of p0 = 0.30 and p1 = 0.23, we calculate that accruing 1700 patients (N = 850 per arm) yields
statistical power of 0.907 in a level 0.025 hypothesis test of the null hypothesis H0 : p0 = p1.
In a fixed sample study, the 1,700 subjects (850 per arm) provide statistical power of 0.9066 to
detect the design alternative of θ = −0.07 when the control group’s 28 day mortality rate is 30%.
If the estimated variability of θˆ at the conclusion of such a trial were to agree exactly with the
variance used in the sample size calculation, the null hypothesis would be rejected in a frequentist
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hypothesis test if the absolute difference in 28 day mortality rates showed that the mortality on
the antibody arm was at least .0418 lower than that on the placebo arm (i.e., we would reject
H0 if and only if θˆ < − 0.0418). The precision provided by the planned sample size can also
be characterized by the hypotheses that can be discriminated by a 95% confidence interval. For
instance, a clinical trial result corresponding to the greatest observed treatment effect which still
does not allow rejection of the null hypothesis (so θˆ just greater than -0.0418) would allow a 95%
confidence interval for θ of -0.084 to 0.000. Hence, in such a fixed sample clinical trial a failure to
reject the null hypothesis could with 95% confidence be viewed as ruling out as much as an 8.4%
improvement in 28 day mortality.
2.2 Definition of Stopping Rules
Stopping rules are introduced into clinical trial design in order to allow early termination of a
trial when the ultimate decision is known with high confidence. Such a stopping rule defines the
conditions under which accrual of new information will be halted. Typically, the conditions for early
stopping are defined in the context of some statistic estimating the scientific measure of treatment
effect or the statistical measures of our confidence in some decision.
Notationally, a stopping rule is defined for a schedule of analyses occurring at sample sizes N1,
N2, . . . , NJ , where we define Nj as the total number of observations accrued by the time of the jth
analysis. For j = 1, . . . , J , we calculate a statistic Tj based on the first Nj observations. Common
choices for Tj include the maximum likelihood estimate θˆj, a normalized Z statistic based on
the null hypothesis, a P value, Bayesian posterior probabilities, Bayesian predictive probabilities,
or conditional power. The outcome space for Tj is then partitioned into stopping set Sj and
continuation set Cj . Starting with j = 1, the clinical trial proceeds by computing test statistic
Tj , and if Tj ∈ Sj , the trial is stopped. Otherwise, Tj is in the continuation set Cj , and the trial
gathers observations until the available sample size is Nj+1. By choosing CJ = ∅, the empty set,
the trial must stop at or before the J-th analysis.
As noted in the companion paper [15], for this placebo controlled trial, it seems reasonable
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to restrict attention to stopping rules having at most two boundaries, i.e., stopping rules with
continuation sets of the form Cj = (aj , dj) such that −∞ < aj < dj < ∞. In the example sepsis
trial, the test statistic was defined such that interim results which were less than aj would be
suggestive of a truly beneficial treatment, and hence this lower boundary is often referred to as the
“efficacy boundary” for the candidate stopping rules. Similarly, interim results which exceeded dj
would be suggestive of a treatment which was not as efficacious as hoped for. For reasons described
more fully in the next section, this upper boundary is referred to as the “futility boundary”.
Particular families of group sequential designs correspond to parameterized boundary functions
which relate the stopping boundaries for some specified statistic Tj at successive analyses according
to the proportion of statistical information accrued and some hypothesized treatment effect. For
instance, letting Πj represent the proportion of the maximal statistical information available at
the j-th analysis (e.g., Πj = Nj/NJ for the most commonly used analytic models), then for some
specified parametric function fd(), the boundary function for the upper boundary might be given by
dj = fd(θd,Πj), where θd is some hypothesis of relevance to the computation of that boundary (e.g.,
the hypothesis rejected when Tj > dj , the null or alternative hypothesis, or the current best estimate
of the treatment effect). Furthermore, many of the group sequential design families previously
described can be expressed in a parameterization which has dj = f(θd, g(Πj ;Ad, Pd, Rd, Gd)) with
boundary shape function
g(Π;A,P,R,G) = (A+Π−P (1−Π)R)G
where parameters A, P , and R are typically specified by the user to attain some desired level of
conservative behavior at the earliest analyses, and critical value G might be found in an iterative
search to attain some specified operating characteristics (e.g., frequentist type I error and power)
when the stopping rule is to be used as the basis of a decision rule [7]. The way in which the
boundary shape function is combined with the boundary hypothesis will depend upon the exact
form of the test statistic, and contrasting the intuitive appeal of some of the different approaches is
the major topic of this paper. However, as discussed in the companion papers, stopping boundaries
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defined for one test statistic induce stopping boundaries for all other statistics commonly used in
specifying stopping rules. Thus, it is largely immaterial how the stopping rule is initially defined,
so long as the operating characteristics of the stopping rule are adequately evaluated.
For the purposes of our illustration, we consider several of the stopping rules actually consid-
ered during the design of the sepsis clinical trial. As this paper focuses primarily on the choice
of “futility” boundary for the sequential sampling plan, we will restrict attention to fixed sample
designs and stopping rules having an O’Brien-Fleming “efficacy” boundary combined with several
candidate “futility” boundaries. Using the nomenclature from the companion paper [15], we con-
sider level 0.025 one-sided hypothesis tests appropriate for testing a null hypothesis H0 : θ ≥ 0
versus the lesser alternative H1 : θ < − 0.07. The variability of the estimate of treatment effect
was assumed to be that which would occur if the 28 day mortality were 30% on the placebo arm
and 23% on the antibody arm. Specific futility stopping boundaries examined reflect a spectrum
of strategies for defining such boundaries.
3 Criteria for Early Decisions Against Efficacy
Our goal in this paper is to contrast two alternative approaches to selection of “futility boundaries”:
decision theoretic and stochastic curtailment. These two approaches differ primarily in the way
they use the “boundary hypothesis”– the hypothesized treatment effect used to compute a stopping
boundary. In the decision theoretic approach, the futility stopping boundary can be parameterized
by criteria for rejection of the boundary hypothesis. This is the approach used in such families as
the triangular and double triangular test [3], the symmetric designs [4], the asymmetric designs
of Pampallona and Tsiatis [5], the unified family [7], error spending families which consider type
II as well as type I error [9, 17], and families defined for Bayesian posterior probabilities. In
the stochastic curtailment approach, the futility stopping boundary considers the conditional or
Bayesian predictive probability that a final study result would correspond to rejection of the null.
The magnitude of such a probability depends of course on some hypothesized treatment effect (or
distribution for the treatment effect in the case of Bayesian inference), and the boundary hypothesis
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is used as that hypothesized effect. In order to make clear these distinctions, we first review the
statistical basis for frequentist clinical trial design, and then describe in more detail each of the two
approaches.
3.1 Frequentist Clinical Trial Design
The most common paradigm for clinical trial design is based on classical frequentist hypothesis
testing. Treatment effect is measured by some parameter θ, which is typically some comparison
(difference or ratio) of summary measures from probability distributions (e.g., means, medians,
proportions exceeding some threshold, time averaged hazards). The user specifies a null hypothesis
H0 : θ = θ0 corresponding to a treatment having no effect. Ideally, the sample size is then chosen
to provide sufficient precision to be able to reject the null hypothesis with high power when some
“design alternative” H1 : θ = θ1 is true, where θ1 would represent some minimal treatment effect
that is clinically important. “Sufficient precision” is typically taken to mean that the trial would
have high probability of rejecting the null hypothesis under the design alternative, with choices
of power in the range of 80% to 97.5% being common. Alternatively, sample size can be chosen
according to the width of, say, a 95% confidence interval– an approach that corresponds exactly to
a choice of power of 97.5%. In practice, however, logistical constraints are often the limiting factor,
and our ability to accrue patients becomes a major criterion in the definitions of the “minimal
treatment effect that is clinically important” and “sufficient precision”.
No matter whether the values of θ1 and statistical power are chosen purely on scientific and clin-
ical grounds or whether the logistical constraints are the dominating factor, any given clinical trial
design can be viewed as an experiment to discriminate between hypotheses. This was illustrated
in section 2.1 using the fixed sample design for the sepsis trial. In that clinical trial design, a 0.025
level of significance was chosen for rejection of the null hypothesis, and it was desired to have a 90%
chance of obtaining statistically significant results when the difference in 28 day mortality rates was
θ = −0.07. However, as also noted in section 2.1, the sample size of 1700 subjects was not sufficient
to discriminate with 95% confidence between the null hypothesis and the “design alternative” of
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-0.07. Instead, it is possible that an estimated treatment effect of θˆ = −0.0417 might be observed,
with a failure to reject the null hypothesis with a P value of 0.0253 just greater than 0.025 and a
95% confidence interval for θ of -0.0835 to 0.0001. Such a confidence interval has clearly not ruled
out the design alternative of -0.07, although it does necessarily rule out the alternative θ = 0.0837
for which the study had 97.5% power.
3.2 Decision Theoretic Approach
The decision theoretic approach to a futility stopping boundary chooses thresholds for early ter-
mination of a study according to rejection of the alternative to be discriminated from the null
hypothesis. The approach here is to define the futility stopping boundary in a manner that is ex-
actly analogous to that used for early stopping with a decision for efficacy. Thus, a clinical trial is
stopped early for futility when the data provides sufficient evidence that the alternative hypothesis
is not true, with some allowance for conservatism at the earliest analyses.
A number of equivalent test statistics are commonly used in the definition of an efficacy stopping
rule for a one-sided test of a lesser hypothesis. In the context of the sepsis trial introduced in section
2.1, suppose that at the j-th analysis we had accrued N0j = N1j = Nj subjects to the placebo and
antibody arms, respectively, and that the random variables measuring the corresponding observed
number of patients dying within 28 days were Y0j =
∑N0j
i=1 X0i and Y1j =
∑N1j
i=1 X1i. For the
instance in which we observe Y0j = y0j and Y1j = y1j, for a one-sided hypothesis test of a lesser
hypothesis an efficacy stopping boundary in the unified family of group sequential designs [7] rejects
H0 : θ ≥ θ0 with (lower) type I error α if θˆj < a(θˆ)j , where
a
(θˆ)
j = θ0 − (Aa +Π−Paj (1−Πj)Ra )Ga
for suitably chosen design parameters Aa, Pa, Ra, and Ga. The analogous approach to a futility
stopping boundary thus rejects H1 : θ < θ1 with (upper) type II error β if θˆj ≥ d(θˆ)j , where
d
(θˆ)
j = θ1 + (Ad +Π
−Pd
j (1−Πj)Rd )Gd
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for suitably chosen design parameters Ad, Pd, Rd, and Gd. In particular, the design parameters are
chosen such that a
(θˆ)
J = d
(θˆ)
J to force stopping at the Jth analysis and such that
α =
J∑
ℓ=1
Pr
[
θˆℓ < a
(θˆ)
ℓ ,
ℓ−1⋂
k=1
a
(θˆ)
k < θˆk < d
(θˆ)
k |θ = θ0
]
β =
J∑
ℓ=1
Pr
[
θˆℓ ≥ d(θˆ)ℓ ,
ℓ−1⋂
k=1
a
(θˆ)
k < θˆk < d
(θˆ)
k |θ = θ1
]
,
to obtain the desired type I and type II errors. Note that the choice α = β results in the same
statistical criteria to be used in rejecting the null and alternative hypotheses, and with such a choice
the discrimination between the null and alternative hypotheses is exactly equivalent to inference
based on a 100(1 − 2α)% confidence interval for θ.
These stopping boundaries could also be converted to a number of equivalent boundary scales
suitable for comparing to other test statistics:
1. Partial sum statistic: Sj = sj = y1j − y0j , which represents the difference in the number
of deaths between the two arms. The partial sum statistic was used for the definition of
stopping rules by Whitehead and Stratton [3], Emerson and Fleming [4], and Pampallona
and Tsiatis [5]. An O’Brien-Fleming [2] boundary rejecting a null hypothesis of no treatment
effect is constant on the scale of this statistic. Conversion of the unified family stopping
boundary to this scale results in rejection of H0 if Sj < a
(S)
j and rejection of H1 if Sj ≥ d(S)j
where a
(S)
j = Nja
(θˆ)
j and d
(S)
j = Njd
(θˆ)
j .
2. Normalized Z statistic: Zj = zj = (θˆj−θ0)/se(θˆj) =
√
Nj(θˆj−θ0)/σ where se(θˆj) ≡ σ/
√
Nj is
typically estimated as described in section 2 using σˆ =
√
2pˆ(1− pˆ) when sample sizes are equal
on the two treatment arms. The normalized Z statistic was used for the definition of stopping
rules by Wang and Tsiatis [6]. A Pocock [1] boundary rejecting a null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0
of no treatment effect is constant on the scale of this statistic. Conversion of the unified
family stopping boundary to this scale results in rejection of H0 if Zj < a
(Z)
j and rejection
of H1 if Zj ≥ d(Z)j where a(Z)j =
√
Nj(a
(θˆ)
j − θ0)/σ and d(Z)j =
√
Nj(d
(θˆ)
j − θ0)/σ. While the
http://biostats.bepress.com/uwbiostat/paper243
Stochastic Curtailment in Group Sequential Designs - 11/08/2004, 12
normalized Z statistic Zj is defined in the form used for rejecting the null hypothesis, stopping
boundaries could have been defined equally easily for rejecting the alternative hypothesis as
Z∗j =
√
Nj(θˆj − θ1)/σ = Zj −
√
Nj(θ1 − θ0)/σ,
thus showing the parallels between the form of the efficacy and futility boundaries.
3. Fixed sample P value statistic: Pj = Φ(zj), which would represent the lower one-sided P value
if the observed data had been gathered in a fixed sample study. In clinical trial designs which
allow for early stopping, however, this scale does not represent a true P value and is therefore
not easily interpreted. Nevertheless, based on the findings of Pocock [1], this statistic is
of some use when implementing a group sequential stopping rule derived using asymptotic
theory. In that research it was found that the statistical properties of such stopping rules were
relatively invariant when used with fixed sample P values computed for statistics having other
distributions (e.g., the t distribution). Conversion of the unified family stopping boundary
to this scale results in rejection of H0 if Pj < a
(P )
j and rejection of H1 if Pj ≥ d(P )j where
a
(P )
j = Φ(
√
Nj(a
(θˆ)
j − θ0)/σ) and d(P )j = Φ(
√
Nj(d
(θˆ)
j − θ0)/σ).
4. Error spending statistic: An error spending statistic can be defined for any of the four bound-
aries based on an arbitrary hypothesized value for the true treatment effect. For instance, if
a group sequential stopping rule were defined for the partial sum statistic and the observed
value of the test statistic at the j-th analysis were Sj = sj, the type I error spending statistic
defined for the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 is
Eaj =
1
α
(
Pr
[
Sj < sj ,
j−1⋂
k=1
a
(S)
k < Sk < d
(S)
k | θ = θ0
]
+
j−1∑
ℓ=1
Pr
[
Sℓ < a
(S)
ℓ ,
ℓ−1⋂
k=1
a
(S)
k < Sk < d
(S)
k | θ = θ0
])
,
and the type II error spending statistic defined for the alternative hypothesis H1 : θ = θ1 is
Edj =
1
β
(
Pr
[
Sj ≥ sj ,
j−1⋂
k=1
a
(S)
k < Sk < d
(S)
k | θ = θ0
]
+
j−1∑
ℓ=1
Pr
[
Sℓ ≥ d(S)ℓ ,
ℓ−1⋂
k=1
a
(S)
k < Sk < d
(S)
k | θ = θ0
])
.
The error spending scale is used for the computation of the stopping boundaries using the
methods of Lan and DeMets [8], Pampallona, Tsiatis, and Kim [9], and others [17, 18].
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Computation of the probabilities used for this scale generally requires recursive numerical
integration as described by Armitage, McPherson, and Rowe [19].
5. Bayesian posterior probabilities: The decision theoretic approach can also be used when
Bayesian posterior probabilities are the basis for rejection of hypotheses. This approach
is discussed in detail in the companion paper on Bayesian evaluation of group sequential
stopping rules [20].
3.3 Stochastic Curtailment Approach
In the stochastic curtailment approach to a futility stopping boundary, the criterion for early
stopping is based on a measure of the probability that the null hypothesis would eventually be
rejected at the final analysis. This approach includes computations of frequentist conditional power
and Bayesian predictive power.
Conditional power is the frequentist conditional probability that the test statistic at the final
(J-th) analysis would exceed the threshold for declaring statistical significance, where we condition
on the observed statistic Sj = sj at the j-th analysis and assume some particular value for the
true treatment effect θ [21]. The conditional power at the j-th analysis is computed by noting that
under the independent increment structure of information accrual, the test statistic at the final
(J-th) analysis is a weighted average of the analogous test statistic at the j-th analysis and an
increment of information accrued between the j-th analysis and the (J-th) analysis. We condition
on the observed results at the interim analysis, and we compute the sampling distribution of the as
yet unobserved increment under some presumption of the true treatment effect θ. Common choices
for the hypothesized value of θ to use in these calculations are the null hypothesis θ = θ0 (especially
when considering interim results that lead to early stopping for efficacy), the alternative hypothesis
θ = θ1 (especially when considering interim results that lead to early stopping for futility), or the
current crude estimate of treatment effect θ = θˆj.
These computations most often ignore any effect of a stopping rule on the sampling density for
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the data observed to date, and presume a distribution corresponding to a fixed sample study. For
instance, when considering whether to stop a clinical trial due to the futility of obtaining results
which would change clinical practice, we might define a conditional power statistic using an efficacy
threshold a
(S)
J defined for the partial sum statistic. Such a threshold would represent the critical
value for declaring statistical significance at the J-th analysis. Using large sample results and an
alternative hypothesis H1 : θ = θ1, we might compute conditional power as
Cj(a
(S)
J , θ1) = Pr(SJ < a
(S)
J |Sj = sj; θ = θ1)
= Φ
(
a
(S)
J − sj − (NJ −Nj)θ1]
σ
√
(NJ −Nj)
)
.
The statistic Cj based on this conditional power can be used as a basis for a futility stopping
rule if we stop the clinical trial for futility when Cj ≥ d(C)j for a suitable set of thresholds d(C)j
for j = 1, . . . , J − 1. (Note that unlike the statistics described for the decision theoretic approach
where high values of the test statistic were suggestive of futility in the one-sided test of a lower
alternative, a low value for the conditional power statistic will tend to lead to early stopping for
futility).
It is often the case that futility rules based on conditional power use a constant threshold
across successive analyses, with values of d
(C)
j = 0.10 or 0.20 chosen by many users. However, as
with stopping rules based on other statistics, a boundary shape function can be used to describe
thresholds that might make it easier to stop for futility as the statistical information accrues. It is
also possible to describe futility stopping rules that are based on conditional power statistics that
use different values of θ at the different analyses. For instance, a conditional power statistic might
use the current best estimate of the treatment effect θˆj [22] or the lower limit of, say, a fixed sample
95% confidence interval for θ computed at the jth analysis. Futility measures based on conditional
power have been proposed for use when stopping a clinical trial early is to be based on stochastic
curtailment [21, 12], as well as for adaptive redesign of a clinical trial [23].
It should be clear that there is a 1:1 correspondence between stopping rules defined under the
decision theoretic approach and those defined using stochastic curtailment, because the conditional
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power statistic defined above is a monotonic transformation of the partial sum statistic. It is
thus of some interest to examine how stochastic curtailment futility boundaries relate to designs
within the unified family of group sequential stopping rules. For instance, the futility boundary
within the unified family will be of the form d
(S)
j = Nj(θ1 + (Ad + Π
−Pd
j (1 − Πj)Rd)Gd), with
an efficacy boundary of the form a
(S)
j = Nj(θ0 − (Aa + Π−Paj (1 − Πj)Ra)Ga). The constraint
that a
(S)
J = d
(S)
J dictates that the threshold for statistical significance at the final analysis is
a
(S)
J = NJ(θ0− (Aa+0Ra)Ga) = NJ(θ1+(Ad+0Rd)Gd). Inserting these formulas into the formula
for the conditional power with Πj = Nj/NJ and sj = d
(S)
j yields
Cj(a
(S)
J , θ1) = Φ
(
NJ0
RdGd +NJAdGd(1−Πj)−NJΠ−Pd+1j (1−Πj)Rd
σ
√
NJ −Nj
)
,
which is constant across analyses (i.e., independent of j) if Ad = 0, Pd = 1, and Rd = 0. In that
case, which corresponds to an O’Brien-Fleming boundary shape function, Cj(a
(S)
J , θ1) = 0.5 at each
analysis. This also suggests that no other useful member of the unified family will correspond to a
constant conditional power when computed under a single alternative.
We can also examine the conditional power futility rule when computed under the maximum
likelihood estimate of treatment effect at each analysis. In that case, at the jth analysis, we compute
Cj(a
(S)
J , θˆj), with θˆj = θ1 + (Ad +Π
−Pd
j (1−Πj)Rd)Gd. Again using Πj = Nj/NJ and sj = d(S)j we
find
Cj(a
(S)
J , θ = θˆj) = Φ
(√
NJ(0
RdGd −Π−Pdj (1−Πj)Rd
σ
√
1−Πj
)
,
which is constant across analyses (i.e., independent of j) if Pd = 0, and Rd = 0.5. In that case, the
constant conditional power threshold will vary with the choice of Ad. There is no member of the
unified family of group sequential stopping boundaries that corresponds to a constant conditional
power computed using the lower bound θˆj− z0.975σ/
√
Nj of a fixed sample 95% confidence interval
at the jth analysis.
In Table 1, we explore the relationships between stopping boundaries derived from the stochastic
curtailment and decision theoretic approaches in more detail for seven group sequential designs
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defined for the setting of the sepsis trial: a total of 1700 subjects used to compare 28 day mortality
in a level 0.025 one-sided test of a lesser alternative. All designs considered in Table 1 assume
four equally spaced analyses and have O’Brien-Fleming boundary shape functions for the efficacy
boundary. The futility boundaries considered include
1. SymmOBF.4: O’Brien-Fleming boundary shape function as parameterized in the unified
family (Ad = 0, Pd = 1, Rd = 0) with β = 0.025 to detect an alternative of θ1 = −0.0855.
2. Futility.8: A boundary shape function as parameterized in the unified family (Ad = 0, Pd =
0.8, Rd = 0) with β = 0.025 to detect an alternative of θ1 = −0.0866. (This was the stopping
rule ultimately chosen for the sepsis clinical trial.)
3. Futility.tri: Triangular test [3] boundary shape function as parameterized in the unified family
(Ad = 1, Pd = 1, Rd = 0) with β = 0.025 to detect an alternative of θ1 = −0.0889.
4. Cond.07.20: Stopping for futility if the conditional power to detect θ1 = −0.07 is less than
0.20.
5. Cond.Est.20: Stopping for futility if the conditional power to detect θ = θˆj at the jth analysis
is less than 0.20. (This design can also be parameterized in the unified family as Ad = 3.866,
Pd = 0, Rd = 0.5 with β = 0.025 to detect an alternative of θ1 = −0.1091.)
6. Cond.Est.10: Stopping for futility if the conditional power to detect θ = θˆj at the jth analysis
is less than 0.10. (This design can also be parameterized in the unified family as Ad = 2.267,
Pd = 0, Rd = 0.5 with β = 0.025 to detect an alternative of θ1 = −0.1028.)
7. Cond.LowCI.20: Stopping for futility if the conditional power to detect θ = θˆj − 1.96σ/
√
Nj
at the jth analysis is less than 0.20.
For each of these seven designs, we present the frequentist inference (bias adjusted estimate,
along with confidence intervals and P values computed using the sample mean ordering [24]) cor-
responding to the futility stopping boundaries at the jth analysis for j = 1, 2, 3, along with the
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conditional power computations when assuming θ1 = −0.07, θ1 = −0.0855, θ1 = θˆj (the current
MLE), and θ1 = θˆj−1.96σ/
√
Nj (the lower bound of the current fixed sample confidence interval).
Table 1: Frequentist inference (bias adjusted estimate, confidence intervals and P values computed
using the sample mean ordering [24]) corresponding to the futility stopping boundaries at the jth
analysis for j = 1, 2, 3, along with the conditional power computations when assuming θ1 = −0.07,
θ1 = −0.0855, θ1 = θˆj (the current MLE), and θ1 = θˆj − 1.96σ/
√
Nj (the lower bound of the
current fixed sample confidence interval). Each design assumes four equally spaced analysis after
425, 850, 1275, and 1700 subjects have been accrued to the study.
Analysis Presumed True Treatment Effect (θ)
Design Time:j BAM Crude 95% CI P Value .0855 .0700 θˆj θˆlow(0.95)
SymmOBF.4 1 0.077 ( 0.001, 0.139) 0.977 0.500 0.265 0.000 0.000
2 -0.006 (-0.060, 0.044) 0.401 0.500 0.304 0.002 0.191
3 -0.031 (-0.079, 0.010) 0.067 0.500 0.358 0.091 0.252
Futility.8 1 0.038 (-0.037, 0.101) 0.846 0.704 0.462 0.000 0.072
2 -0.017 (-0.071, 0.034) 0.263 0.634 0.432 0.015 0.417
3 -0.035 (-0.082, 0.008) 0.053 0.582 0.438 0.142 0.281
Futility.tri 1 0.019 (-0.055, 0.082) 0.697 0.793 0.575 0.000 0.333
2 -0.026 (-0.080, 0.025) 0.161 0.748 0.561 0.059 0.655
3 -0.039 (-0.087, 0.005) 0.040 0.681 0.543 0.231 0.326
Cond.07.20 1 0.092 ( 0.016, 0.153) 0.990 0.416 0 .200 0.000 0.000
2 0.003 (-0.051, 0.053) 0.541 0.371 0 .200 0.000 0.066
3 -0.025 (-0.072, 0.017) 0.113 0.316 0 .200 0.025 0.198
Cond.Est.20 1 -0.035 (-0.109, 0.016) 0.083 0.951 0.846 0 .200 0.995
2 -0.037 (-0.109, 0.009) 0.056 0.864 0.721 0 .200 0.868
3 -0.040 (-0.109, 0.005) 0.039 0.671 0.532 0 .200 0.372
Cond.Est.10 1 -0.029 (-0.102, 0.026) 0.140 0.932 0.806 0 .100 0.983
2 -0.032 (-0.102, 0.016) 0.090 0.800 0.628 0 .100 0.751
3 -0.037 (-0.102, 0.008) 0.054 0.534 0.391 0 .100 0.302
Cond.LowCI.20 1 0.024 (-0.049, 0.088) 0.756 0.748 0.515 0.000 0 .200
2 -0.011 (-0.064, 0.043) 0.376 0.504 0.307 0.003 0 .200
3 -0.028 (-0.074, 0.016) 0.111 0.315 0.199 0.024 0 .200
From Table 1, we immediately see that there is a wide range of conditional power values as
we vary the assumptions about the true treatment effect for the same futility stopping rule. Fur-
thermore, it is also evident that some of the ad hoc rules commonly proposed for futility rules
(e.g., Cond.07.20 which suggests early stopping for futility only if the conditional power computed
under the design alternative is less than 20%) are markedly more conservative than the O’Brien-
Fleming boundary, which is well-known for its extreme conservatism. On the other hand, other
such ad hoc rules (e.g., Cond.Est.20 which suggests early stopping for futility if the conditional
power computed under the current MLE is less than 20%) is so liberal as to cause substantial loss
of precision, as evidenced by the width of the 95% confidence interval: At the third futility analysis,
the point estimates at the Futility.8 stopping boundary and the Cond.Est.20 stopping boundary
http://biostats.bepress.com/uwbiostat/paper243
Stochastic Curtailment in Group Sequential Designs - 11/08/2004, 18
are comparable, but the 95% confidence interval is 24% wider for the Cond.Est.20 stopping rule.
In Table 1, surprisingly high conditional powers are sometimes associated with conservative
stopping boundaries. Part of this seeming paradox can be explained by considering whether the
assumptions used to compute the various conditional powers are relevant to the current state of
knowledge. Table 2 presents such conditional probability values for both the futility and efficacy
boundaries of the Futility.8 stopping rule actually used in the sepsis trial. For each analysis time,
we consider the conditional probability that an observation corresponding exactly to the threshold
for early stopping might eventually lead to a test statistic at the final analysis which would allow
rejection of the null hypothesis. That is, according to the stopping boundaries presented in Table
2, the null hypothesis is to be rejected if the crude estimate for the difference in 28 day mortality
rates (treatment minus comparison) is -0.042 or less at the final analysis (when 1700 subjects’
data is available). That stopping rule also suggests that after observing data on the first 425
subjects, a crude estimate for the difference in mortality rates of 0.047 or greater would lead to
early termination of the study for futility. From Table 2, we see that if the alternative hypothesis
of a difference of 28 day mortality rates of -0.07 is true, then upon observing a difference of 0.047
on the first 425 subjects, there is still a 46.2% chance that the next 1275 subjects’ data would
be such that the crude estimate of treatment difference would be less than -0.042 at the final
analysis. On the other hand, if the null hypothesis of a true difference in mortality of 0.00 were
true, there is only a 0.2% chance that the data yet to be accrued, when combined with the observed
crude estimate of 0.047 at the first analysis, would result in a crude estimate of the difference in
mortality rates less than -0.042 at the final analysis. Of course, if a clinical trial obtains results
corresponding to the futility boundary at the first analysis, it might not be reasonable to assume
either the null or alternative hypothesis. Thus some clinical trialists would consider computing the
conditional probability of obtaining significant results at the final analysis under the assumption
that the true difference in 28 day mortality rates corresponds to the crude estimate obtained at the
current analysis, i.e., for an observed value corresponding exactly to the futility boundary at the
first analysis, calculate the conditional probability of achieving a statistically significant result at
the final analysis under the assumption that the true difference in mortality is 0.047. From Table
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Table 2: Stopping probabilities and stochastic curtailment measures of the conditional probability
of rejecting the null hypothesis at the final analysis for the Futility.8 stopping rule. Using this
stopping rule, after 1700 subjects have been accrued to the study, a trial result corresponding to
an absolute difference in 28 day mortality rates less than -0.0424 would be judged statistically
significant at the 0.025 level. Conditional probabilities are computed assuming a true value of
θ corresponding to the current crude estimate of treatment effect, the null H0 : θ ≥ 0, and the
alternative H1 : θ = −0.07.
Probability of Exceeding Conditional Power
Stopping At First Time Pr(θˆJ ≥ −0.0424|θˆj , θ)
Analysis Crude MLE of Alternative Null Current Alternative Null Current
Time Treatment Effect θ = −.07 θ = 0 MLE θ = −.07 θ = 0 Estimate
Efficacy (lower) boundary
1:N=425 -0.170 0.010 0.000 0.500 0.998 0.500 1.000
2:N=850 -0.085 0.302 0.002 0.477 0.990 0.500 0.998
3:N=1275 -0.057 0.400 0.009 0.331 0.950 0.500 0.907
4:N=1700 -0.042 0.178 0.013 0.200 – – –
Futility (upper) boundary
1:N=425 0.047 0.003 0.134 0.500 0.462 0.002 0.000
2:N=850 -0.010 0.021 0.496 0.413 0.432 0.006 0.015
3:N=1275 -0.031 0.040 0.271 0.271 0.438 0.036 0.142
4:N=1700 -0.042 0.047 0.074 0.175 – – –
2, we see that under this assumption that the true difference is equal to the current crude estimate,
the conditional power of the study is less that 0.05%. Similar interpretations can be applied to trial
results which correspond to the futility boundary at the second analysis. Thus, if we observe a crude
estimate of mortality rate difference of -0.01 after accruing data on 850 subjects, the conditional
probability of a statistically significant result at the final analysis is 43.2% if the true treatment
effect is the alternative of -0.07, 0.6% if the true treatment effect is the null hypothesis of 0.00, and
1.5% if the true treatment effect corresponds to the current crude estimate of -0.01.
None of these conditional power calculations are entirely satisfactory in and of themselves,
because each is assuming a single value for the unknown treatment effect, and that assumption
may or may not be appropriate. This problem is highlighted when we consider the conditional
power calculations for the futility boundary under the assumption of the alternative. For instance, it
seems somewhat surprising to see that when calculating the conditional power under the alternative
hypothesis of a true difference in mortality rates of -0.07, the Futility.8 stopping boundary for
futility corresponds to surprisingly high values of conditional power– much higher than the 10%
or 20% values commonly quoted by clinical trialists using conditional power criteria to define such
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stopping boundaries. A conditional power of, say, 46.2% must be reconciled with the fact that
the Futility.8 boundary was chosen in the actual clinical trial, because it did not result in a very
marked loss of statistical power for the alternative hypotheses of greatest interest, nor did adoption
of that stopping rule greatly affect the alternatives for which the clinical trial has prescribed levels
of power [15]. This seeming paradox is resolved when we consider whether assuming the alternative
hypothesis when such results have been obtained is reasonable.
To address this issue, we also present in Table 2 the probability of stopping the clinical trial at
each of the analyses under the corresponding presumed true treatment effects. It should be noted
that while the stopping probabilities under the null hypothesis of θ = 0 and the design alternative
of θ = −0.07 sum to 1.0, those given under the assumption that the current MLE is correct do
not. This is because in the column corresponding to the current MLE, a different treatment effect
is presumed for each row of the table. Immediately apparent from these stopping probabilities is
the fact that it is often the case that presuming the null or alternative hypothesis is true is often
quite unreasonable for some stopping boundaries. For instance, if θ = −0.07, the probability of
stopping at the first analysis with a decision for futility is 0.003. From Table 1, we see that at that
boundary, the 95% confidence interval for θ is from -0.037 to 0.101. These results would argue that
a conditional power computation based on a presumed treatment effect of θ = −0.07 (which has
been ruled out with high confidence) was largely irrelevant. The 46.2% conditional probability or
a reversed decision under this presumption is a negligible number of actual trials. This point is
examined further using simulations.
For each of the hypotheses used to compute the conditional power at the stopping boundaries,
Table 3 presents the results of one million clinical trials simulated under either the null (θ = 0.00)
or design alternative (θ = −0.07) hypotheses. Included in this table is the estimated probability
that the trial might exceed either the futility or efficacy boundaries at each analysis. From this
table we see that the probability that the trial might stop at the first analysis with a crude estimate
of the difference in mortality rates of 0.047 or more is 0.31% when the true difference is -0.07 and
13.51% when the true difference is 0.00. Similarly, the probability that the trial might continue
past the first analysis and then stop at the second analysis with a crude estimate greater (more
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positive) than -0.01 is 2.24% and 50.34% when the true difference is -0.07 and 0.00, respectively.
Again, the extremely low probability of stopping for futility at the first analysis when the true
treatment effect is -0.07 would, in a frequentist sense, argue against the relevance of a conditional
power calculation computed under that hypothesis.
It is thus clear that stopping a trial for futility might be quite reasonable despite there being a
high conditional power of reversing the decision at the planned final analysis of a continued trial.
This is illustrated further in Table 3, which also explicitly considers the probability of conflicting
decisions being made at interim analyses and a planned final analysis. Rather than focusing on trial
results occurring exactly on the stopping boundaries, we present for each stopping boundary, both
the conditional and the unconditional probabilities that the decision made at an interim analysis
would not agree with the decision made in a fixed sample design. It should be noted, however,
that when comparing a group sequential design to a fixed sample test in this way, we must consider
the differences in power and sample size. That is, compared to a fixed sample test with the same
maximal sample size, a group sequential test has less power. On the other hand, when compared
to a fixed sample test having the same power, the group sequential test uses fewer subjects on
average. In an attempt to isolate the value of conditional power as a futility measure, we compute
the probability of reversed decisions relative to a fixed sample design which either has the same
maximal sample size (1700 subjects), has the same sample size as the worst case expected sample
size (the worst case ASN for Futility.8 is 1336 subjects when the true treatment effect is -0.047),
or has the same power to detect the alternative of a true treatment effect of -0.07 (1598 subjects).
We note that when comparing efficiency of statistics, the usual comparison is that between two
statistics providing the same type I error and the same power to detect some alternative. Hence,
the comparison based on matched power is perhaps the most theoretically relevant of these fixed
sample tests.
One million clinical trials are simulated under the null hypothesis of a true difference in mortality
rates of 0.00 and the alternative hypothesis of a true difference of -0.07. Under each hypothesis, we
count the number of studies which stop at each analysis for futility and efficacy. We then compute
the percentage of those stopped studies which would have had a reverse statistical decision made
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Table 3: Probabilities that trial decisions at an interim analysis might disagree with that obtained
in a fixed sample analysis. One million clinical trials with a total of 1700 patients were simulated
under the null and alternative hypotheses. Test statistics were computed at four equally spaced
analyses, and the Futility.8 stopping rule was used to make decisions regarding early stopping.
Analyses of each simulated data set were also performed at sample sizes corresponding to the level
0.025 fixed sample tests having the same sample size as the worst case ASN of the Futility.8
stopping rule (N= 1336), having the same power (N= 1598), and having the same maximal sample
size as the stopping rule (N=1700). For each interim analysis, the empirical probability of stopping
for efficacy or futility was computed, along with the unconditional probability that the stopping
rule would dictate early stopping with one decision and the fixed sample test would result in the
opposite decision. Also presented is the conditional probability of reverse decisions defined as the
proportion of trials stopped at a given analysis which would have a reverse decision in the fixed
sample test.
Same Worst Same Power Under the Same Maximal
Case ASN (N=1336) Alternative (N=1598) Sample Size (N=1700)
Analysis Crude Est Stopping
Time of Trt Effect Probability Cond Uncond Cond Uncond Cond Uncond
Null Hypothesis : θ = 0
Efficacy (lower) boundary
1: N= 425 -0.170 0.0000 0.3103 0.0000 0.4483 0.0000 0.4483 0.0000
2: N= 850 -0.085 0.0024 0.2242 0.0005 0.3477 0.0008 0.3751 0.0009
3: N=1275 -0.057 0.0091 0.0228 0.0002 0.2446 0.0022 0.3066 0.0028
4: N=1700 -0.042 0.0132 0.5538 0.0073 0.2431 0.0032 0.0000 0.0000
Total 0.0247 0.3258 0.0080 0.2539 0.0063 0.1498 0.0037
Futility (upper) boundary
1: N= 425 0.047 0.1351 0.0003 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001
2: N= 850 -0.010 0.5034 0.0004 0.0002 0.0014 0.0007 0.0017 0.0009
3: N=1275 -0.031 0.2619 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 0.0010 0.0063 0.0017
4: N=1700 -0.042 0.0749 0.1040 0.0078 0.0596 0.0045 0.0159 0.0012
Total 0.9753 0.0082 0.0080 0.0065 0.0063 0.0039 0.0038
Alternative Hypothesis : θ = −.07
Efficacy (lower) boundary
1: N= 425 -0.170 0.0091 0.0012 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000
2: N= 850 -0.085 0.2984 0.0035 0.0011 0.0033 0.0010 0.0029 0.0009
3: N=1275 -0.057 0.4010 0.0020 0.0008 0.0091 0.0037 0.0088 0.0035
4: N=1700 -0.042 0.1791 0.3909 0.0700 0.0940 0.0168 0.0000 0.0000
Total 0.8877 0.0810 0.0719 0.0242 0.0215 0.0050 0.0044
Futility (upper) boundary
1: N= 425 0.047 0.0031 0.1927 0.0006 0.3484 0.0011 0.4038 0.0012
2: N= 850 -0.010 0.0224 0.0794 0.0018 0.2534 0.0057 0.3283 0.0073
3: N=1275 -0.031 0.0391 0.0003 0.0000 0.1722 0.0067 0.2764 0.0108
4: N=1700 -0.042 0.0478 0.1974 0.0094 0.1819 0.0087 0.0719 0.0034
Total 0.1123 0.1052 0.0118 0.1974 0.0222 0.2032 0.0228
in a fixed sample study conducted after accruing either 1336 (for the study with the same worst
case ASN), 1598 (for the same power study), or 1700 (for the same maximal sample size study).
These conditional probabilities should correspond only approximately to the conditional power
calculations given in Table 2, because in Table 3 we consider studies which exceed the stopping
boundaries in addition to those which stop with results exactly on the boundary. We also present
the unconditional probabilities of reversed decisions, which are equal to the conditional probability
times the stopping probability.
From Table 3 we see that under the alternative hypothesis of a true treatment effect of -0.07, the
probability of stopping for futility at the first analysis is approximately 0.003. Of those trials that
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would stop early for futility in this manner, approximately 40.4% would correspond instead to a
decision for efficacy in a fixed sample analysis conducted with data from 1700 subjects. This number
differs somewhat from the conditional power of 46.2% reported in Table 2 in part because the latter
number conditions on results observed exactly on the boundary at the first analysis while the value
in Table 3 includes trial results that exceeded the futility boundary by some amount and thus
would tend to have a lower probability of being reversed. The actual impact of this relatively high
conditional probability is quite slight however: As shown in the column for unconditional power of
a reversed decision for this fixed sample test, a 40.4% reversal rate for studies stopped for futility at
the first analysis corresponds to 0.12% of all studies. Table 3 also shows that approximately 19.3%
of studies stopped for futility at the first interim analysis would be expected to correspond to a
decision for efficacy if a fixed sample study continued to accrue 1336 subjects, although such reversal
of the decision represents only 0.06% of all possible outcomes under the alternative. Similarly, while
34.8% of those trials stopping for futility at the first analysis do not agree with the result which
would have been reported in a fixed sample study with 1598 subjects, the actual proportion of
studies with such a reversal is quite small at 0.11%. Clearly, there would be minimal impact on the
unconditional power when using futility rules which correspond to these seemingly high thresholds
for conditional power.
This then highlights one problem with the use of conditional power arguments: A high con-
ditional power may correspond to a neglible proportion of trials overall, and a lower conditional
power may correspond to a higher proportion of trials overall. For instance, though the conditional
probability of reversing a decision for efficacy at the first analysis is approximately 44.8% under
the null hypothesis when considering a 1700 subject fixed sample study, this pertains to less than
0.005% of the one million simulated trials. On the other hand, the conditional probability under
the alternative hypothesis of reversing a decision for futility at the third analysis is lower at 27.6%
but pertains to 1.1% of the one million simulated trials.
A further foundational problem with the use of conditional power is apparent when a group
sequential design is compared to a fixed sample design having the same power to detect the alterna-
tive hypothesis. When the group sequential design Futility.8 is compared to a fixed sample design
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having 1598 subjects, both the type I error (0.025) and the power (0.975) agree between the two
studies. This can be seen from Table 3 by noting that the total proportion of trials corresponding
to a futility decision in the group sequential test and an efficacy decision in the fixed sample test
is 0.0063 under the null hypothesis and 0.0222 under the alternative hypothesis–identical (except
for random sampling in the simulations) to the proportion of trials corresponding to an efficacy
decision in the group sequential test and a futility decision in the fixed sample test under the re-
spective hypotheses (0.0063 under the null and 0.0215 under the alternative). When holding the
treatment effect constant, there is of course no reason to prefer making a mistake with one sample
over another. In the case of the null hypothesis, ever deciding for efficacy is an error, and trading
an earlier erroneous decision for a later erroneous decision (or vice versa) is of no consequence
on the error rates when only the behavior of the test under the null is considered. Instead, the
usual frequentist paradigm is to consider which error made under the null hypothesis will lead to
a more powerful and/or efficient test. Because conditional power arguments are based solely on
considering tradeoffs between decisions made under the same hypothesis, they cannot accurately
predict the impact of a stopping rule on statistical power or efficiency. (These latter concerns are
adequately addressed by evaluating the impact of a stopping rule on the power curve and the ASN
curve relative to various fixed sample designs, as illustrated in Table 5 below.)
As noted above, a portion of the seeming paradox between conditional power calculations and
the more relevant unconditional power and efficiency considerations is due to the use of (at times)
unreasonable assumptions in the calculation of conditional power. The use of the current MLE
and/or the lower bound of confidence intervals to calculate conditional power as shown in Table 1
was an effort to address this problem. Another approach to avoid basing calculations on untenable
assumptions uses a Bayesian paradigm.
The use of Bayesian prior distributions to obtain predictive probabilities addresses some, but not
all, of the problems identified with conditional power. In this approach, the observed data is used
to update some prior distribution for the treatment effect, and then the predictive distribution
of the result at the final analysis is obtained by integrating over the posterior distribution of
the treatment effect parameter. These predictive probabilities have a distinct advantage over the
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conditional probabilities in that the predictive probabilities take into account both prior notions of
the likely values for the true treatment probability and the evidence in the data for the true value.
The Bayesian predictive probability is the probability that the test statistic would exceed some
specified threshold at the final analysis, using a prior distribution and the observed data to compute
a posterior distribution for the treatment effect parameter at the j-th analysis. We consider a
robust approach to Bayesian inference based on a coarsening of the data by using the asymptotic
distribution of a nonparametric estimate of treatment effect [25] as described more fully in our
companion paper on Bayesian evaluation of group sequential designs [16]. That is, rather than the
exact binomial distributions for the two arms of the sepsis trial, we use the approximate normal
distribution for the estimated difference in 28 day mortality rates. In the case of a compuatationally
convenient conjugate normal prior θ ∼ N(ζ, τ2), at the jth analysis we can define an approximate
Bayesian posterior distribution for the true treatment effect θ conditioned on the observation θˆj as
θ|θˆj∼˙N
(
θˆjτ
2 + ζσ2/Nj
τ2 + σ2/Nj
,
τ2σ2/Nj
τ2 + σ2/Nj
)
.
Then, using the sampling distribution for the as yet unobserved data and integrating over the
posterior distribution, the predictive distribution for the estimate θˆJ at the final analysis is
θˆJ |θˆj∼˙N
(
(τ2 + σ2/NJ)Πj θˆj + (1−Πj)ζσ2/NJ
Πjτ2 + σ2/NJ
,
(1−ΠJ)(τ2 + σ2/NJ )σ2/NJ
Π2j(ΠJτ
2 + σ2/NJ)
)
.
We might therefore compute a predictive probability statistic analogous to the conditional power
statistic as
Hj(a
(θˆ)
J , ζ, τ
2) =
∫
Pr(θˆJ < a
(θˆ)
J |Sj = sj , θ) p(θ |Sj = sj) dθ
= Φ

 [Πjτ2 + σ2/NJ ][a(θˆ)J − θˆj] + [1−Πj ][θˆj − ζ]σ2/NJ√
[1−Πj ][τ2 + σ2/NJ ][Πjτ2 + σ2/Nj ]σ2/NJ

 .
The case of a noninformative (although improper) prior is of special interest. When we consider
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taking the limit as τ2 →∞, the predictive probability statistic becomes
Hj(a
(θˆ)
J , ζ, τ
2 =∞) = Φ

 (a(θˆ)J − θˆj)√Πj√
[1−Πj ]σ2/NJ

 .
As with the conditional power statistic, we can examine the relations between stopping rules
defined based on thresholds for predictive power and stopping boundaries defined using the decision
theoretic approach of the unified family. On the MLE scale, the futility boundary within the unified
family will be of the form d
(θˆ)
j = θ1+(Ad+Π
−Pd
j (1−Πj)Rd)Gd, with an efficacy boundary of the form
a
(θˆ)
j = θ0 − (Aa + Π−Paj (1 −Πj)Ra)Ga. The constraint that a(θˆ)J = d(θˆ)J dictates that the threshold
for statistical significance at the final analysis is a
(θˆ)
J = θ0 − (Aa + 0Ra)Ga = θ1 + (Ad + 0Rd)Gd.
Inserting these formulas into the formula for the conditional power with Πj = Nj/NJ and θˆj = d
(θˆ)
j
yields
Hj(a
(θˆ)
J , ζ, τ
2) =
Φ
(
[Πjτ
2+σ2/NJ ][0
Rd−Π
−Pd
j (1−Πj)
Rd ]Gd+[1−Πj ][θ1+(Ad+Π
−Pd
j (1−Πj)
Rd)Gd−ζ]σ
2/NJ√
[1−Πj ][τ2+σ2/NJ ][Πjτ2+σ2/Nj ]σ2/NJ
)
,
which is in general dependent upon j, suggesting that no useful member of the unified family of
stopping rules corresponds to a constant threshold on the Bayesian predictive probability scale for
an arbitrary prior. However, for a noninformative prior, the statistic on a unified family futility
stopping boundary becomes
Hj(a
(θˆ)
J , ζ, τ
2) = Φ
(
[Π0.5j 0
Rd −Π−Pd+0.5j (1−Πj)Rd−0.5]Gd√
σ2/NJ
)
,
which is constant across analyses (i.e., independent of j) if Pd = 0.5, and Rd = 0.5. In that case,
the constant conditional power threshold will vary with the choice of Ad. Such a boundary also
corresponds to Xiong’s [26] sequential conditional probability ratio test.
In Table 4, we explore the relationships between stopping boundaries derived from the predictive
probability and decision theoretic approaches in more detail for the SymmOBF.4, Futility.8, and
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Futility.tri stopping rules defined above, as well as for five stopping rules defined by Bayesian
predictive probabilities. Again, all group sequential designs are defined for the setting of the sepsis
trial: a total of 1700 subjects used to compare 28 day mortality in a level 0.025 one-sided test of a
lesser alternative. All designs considered in Table 4 assume four equally spaced analyses and have
O’Brien-Fleming boundary shape functions for the efficacy boundary. The futility boundaries all
correspond to early stopping if the predictive probability of a significant result at the final analysis
is less than 10%, though they differ according to the location (ζ) and spread (τ2) of the prior
distribution for θ. The rules considered include some of those considered during the planning of
the sepsis clinical trial: [16]
1. Pred.Dogm.Opt: A highly dogmatic (prior SD τ = 0.015), optimistic prior (prior mean ζ =
−0.09).
2. Pred.Dogm.Pess: A highly dogmatic (prior SD τ = 0.015), pessimistic prior (prior mean
ζ = 0.02).
3. Pred.Vague.Opt: A vague (prior SD τ = 0.15), optimistic prior (prior mean ζ = −0.09).
4. Pred.Vague.Pess: A vague (prior SD τ = 0.15), pessimistic prior (prior mean ζ = 0.02).
5. Pred.Consensus: The sponsor’s consensus prior (prior SD τ = 0.04, prior mean ζ = −0.04).
6. Pred.Noninform: A noninformative prior (prior SD τ =∞). (This design can also be param-
eterized in the unified family as Ad = 1.77, Pd = 0.5, Rd = 0.5 with β = 0.025 to detect an
alternative of θ1 = −0.0906.)
For each of these designs, we present in Table 4 the frequentist inference (bias adjusted esti-
mate, along with confidence intervals and P values computed using the sample mean ordering [24])
corresponding to the futility stopping boundaries at the jth analysis for j = 1, 2, 3, along with
the Bayesian predictive power when assuming prior distributions corresponding to the dogmatic
optimistic (ζ = −0.09, τ = 0.015), vague optimistic (ζ = −0.09, τ = 0.15), sponsor’s consensus
(ζ = −0.04, τ = 0.04), dogmatic pessimistic (ζ = 0.02, τ = 0.015), vague pessimistic (ζ = 0.02,
τ = 0.15), and noninformative (τ =∞) priors.
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Table 4: Stochastic curtailment measures of the predictive probability of rejecting the null hypothesis at the final analysis.
Predictive probabilities are computed under each of the prior distributions defined above.
Analysis Prior Distribution On θ
Dogm/ Vague/ Dogm/ Vague/
Design Time:j BAM Crude 95% CI P Value Opt Opt Cons Pess Pess Noninf
SymmOBF.4 1 0.077 ( 0.001, 0.139) 0.977 0.301 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 -0.006 (-0.060, 0.044) 0.401 0.343 0.026 0.033 0.001 0.021 0.023
3 -0.031 (-0.079, 0.010) 0.067 0.393 0.130 0.129 0.019 0.118 0.124
Futility.8 1 0.038 (-0.037, 0.101) 0.846 0.536 0.011 0.028 0.000 0.007 0.008
2 -0.017 (-0.071, 0.034) 0.263 0.487 0.070 0.079 0.003 0.057 0.063
3 -0.035 (-0.082, 0.008) 0.053 0.476 0.184 0.182 0.031 0.169 0.177
Futility.tri 1 0.019 (-0.055, 0.082) 0.697 0.658 0.037 0.066 0.001 0.025 0.028
2 -0.026 (-0.080, 0.025) 0.161 0.624 0.147 0.155 0.009 0.125 0.135
3 -0.039 (-0.087, 0.005) 0.040 0.584 0.271 0.266 0.056 0.252 0.262
Pred.Dogm.Opt 1 0.125 ( 0.049, 0.186) 0.999 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.018 (-0.037, 0.068) 0.737 0.100 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001
3 -0.018 (-0.065, 0.023) 0.185 0.100 0.013 0.014 0.001 0.011 0.012
Pred.Vague.Opt 1 -0.003 (-0.075, 0.061) 0.474 0.755 0.100 0.133 0.003 0.073 0.081
2 -0.024 (-0.082, 0.028) 0.188 0.549 0.100 0.109 0.005 0.083 0.090
3 -0.034 (-0.085, 0.011) 0.072 0.343 0.100 0.101 0.014 0.090 0.095
Pred.Consensus 1 0.005 (-0.067, 0.070) 0.569 0.713 0.068 0.100 0.002 0.048 0.054
2 -0.023 (-0.078, 0.029) 0.206 0.531 0.091 0.100 0.005 0.076 0.082
3 -0.033 (-0.082, 0.011) 0.074 0.341 0.100 0.100 0.014 0.090 0.095
Pred.Dogm.Pess 1 -0.062 (-0.141, -0.007) 0.013 0.985 0.765 0.727 0.100 0.709 0.742
2 -0.041 (-0.117, 0.045) 0.154 0.918 0.522 0.528 0.100 0.482 0.501
3 -0.035 (-0.111, 0.053) 0.207 0.698 0.335 0.344 0.100 0.313 0.323
Pred.Vague.Pess 1 -0.010 (-0.081, 0.054) 0.394 0.788 0.134 0.165 0.004 0.100 0.111
2 -0.026 (-0.086, 0.025) 0.162 0.582 0.119 0.128 0.007 0.100 0.108
3 -0.035 (-0.088, 0.010) 0.067 0.364 0.111 0.111 0.016 0.100 0.105
Pred.Noninform 1 -0.008 (-0.079, 0.057) 0.422 0.776 0.121 0.153 0.004 0.090 0.100
2 -0.026 (-0.085, 0.026) 0.173 0.567 0.110 0.119 0.006 0.092 0.100
3 -0.035 (-0.087, 0.011) 0.069 0.354 0.105 0.106 0.015 0.095 0.100
From Table 4, we immediately see that, as with conditional power, for any given futility stop-
ping rule there is a wide range of predictive power values as we vary the assumptions about the true
treatment effect (i.e., vary the prior distribution for θ). It is evident that seemingly conservative
futility thresholds for predictive power can be either markedly more conservative or less conserva-
tive than the O’Brien-Fleming boundary, and thus result in sampling plans with greatly varying
efficiency. A priori, we find it difficult to guess the loss of frequentist power that might result from
implementing particular futility rules based on predictive power.
We further note that when used for stochastic curtailment, the Bayesian predictive probability
has many of the same foundational issues as the conditional power measures. From a Bayesian
perspective, it would make the most sense to base scientific decisions on the posterior probability
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of hypotheses and a credible interval for the parameter θ measuring treatment effect. There does
not seem to be a good Bayesian rationale for basing decisions about early stopping on predictions
of whether a future analysis would meet any particular standard, much less a frequentist stan-
dard. While frequentists might be interested in using the Bayesian predictive probability to predict
whether statistical significance (or some other decision criterion) would be attained at some future
analysis (such an approach does account for the variability in the data at an interim analysis),
in this use of predictive probabilities, the foundational issues described for the conditional power
are still present: The predictive probabilities do not take into account the tradeoffs between the
relative likelihood of particular outcomes under the null and alternative hypotheses.
In order to use stochastic curtailment measures such as conditional power or predictive power
as a stopping criterion, it is clear that we must account for the diversity of estimates arising from
making different assumptions about the prior distribution of the treatment effect. Should we use
the frequentist approach placing all emphasis on a single hypothesis (and if so, which hypothesis),
or should we use the Bayesian approach based on a prior distribution for the true treatment effect
parameter (and if so, which prior)? Our feeling is that if some single such measure must be
used, the Bayesian predictive probability based on a noninformative prior provides a reasonable
standard approach. We do note that when using the coarsened Bayes approach, the sensitivity of
the predictive probability to the choice of prior can be displayed in contour plots as described in
our paper on the Bayesian evaluation of group sequential stopping plans. But even with such a
sensitivity analysis, it is not at all clear when a predictive power is sufficiently low to warrant early
termination of a study for reasons of futility.
We have found that the best criterion for establishing whether any particular threshold for
either conditional power or predictive power is reasonable is based on tradeoffs between efficiency
(ASN) and power. Table 5 presents this information for each of the stopping rules considered above.
Each of the stopping rules were based on a maximal sample size of 1700 subjects, and hence any
introduction of a stopping rule will tend to decrease the power to detect a given alternative relative
to the fixed sample test. It was this sort of information that was used by the sponsor and DSMB in
the actual sepsis trial as they chose the Futility.8 stopping rule: Although that stopping rule led to
http://biostats.bepress.com/uwbiostat/paper243
Stochastic Curtailment in Group Sequential Designs - 11/08/2004, 30
a slight decrease in power relative to the symmetric O’Brien-Fleming rule (loss of power of 0.007,
0.006, and 0.002 when θ = −0.05, −0.07, and −0.0855, respectively), such a small loss of power was
judged acceptable given the approximate 10% gain in average efficiency when the null hypothesis
is true. It is worth noting that all of the stopping rules based on stochastic curtailment statistics
(conditional power or predictive power) used futility stopping thresholds of 10-20%, though they
had markedly different unconditional power and efficiency operating characteristics.
Table 5: Posterior probabilities of hypotheses for trial results corresponding to stopping boundaries of Futility.8 stopping rule
with four equally spaced analyses after 425, 850, 1275, and 1700 subjects have been accrued to the study. Posterior probabilities
are computed based on optimistic, the sponsor’s consensus, and pessimistic centering of the priors using three levels of assumed
information in the prior. The variability of the likelihood of the data corresponds to the alternative hypothesis: event rates of
0.30 in the control group and 0.23 in the treatment group.
θ=0 θ=-0.05 θ=-0.07 θ=-0.0855
Design Power ASN Power ASN Power ASN Power ASN
SymmOBF.4 0.025 1099 0.631 1376 0.895 1242 0.975 1099
Futility.8 0.025 987 0.624 1331 0.889 1222 0.972 1088
Futility.tri 0.025 883 0.610 1266 0.876 1187 0.965 1069
Cond.07.20 0.025 1182 0.636 1419 0.899 1260 0.977 1107
Cond.Est.20 0.025 623 0.543 1023 0.797 1024 0.907 964
Cond.Est.10 0.025 677 0.571 1110 0.828 1086 0.928 1006
Cond.LowCI.20 0.025 1033 0.633 1386 0.896 1248 0.975 1102
Pred.Dogm.Opt 0.025 1290 0.638 1450 0.900 1269 0.978 1111
Pred.Vague.Opt 0.025 843 0.616 1281 0.879 1196 0.965 1075
Pred.Consensus 0.025 883 0.621 1306 0.884 1210 0.969 1083
Pred.Dogm.Pess 0.025 489 0.386 687 0.602 726 0.742 727
Pred.Vague.Pess 0.025 803 0.609 1248 0.871 1177 0.960 1064
Pred.Noninform 0.025 818 0.612 1261 0.874 1185 0.962 1068
4 Summary
When clinical trialists are first confronted with the use of a stopping rule, it is quite typical that
they worry about the possibility that decisions made at the interim analysis might be different
from those which would have been reached if the trial had continued to accrue the full sample size.
Indeed, some researchers have suggested that such considerations are at times the ones which should
drive the selection of a stopping rule [12, 13]. While we find the operating characteristics discussed
in our companion papers [15, 16] much more relevant, the persistence of questions about the futility
of continuing a study often dictates that these properties be evaluated. In demonstrating the ways
that measures of futility can be evaluated, we highlighted the reasons that we believe they can be
less useful (at best) or misleading (at worst). Specifically, we find that 1) the dependence of the
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stochastic curtailment calculations on a presumed treatment effect leads to a confusing array of
statistics on which a stopping decision might be based, 2) the nonlinear relationship between the
conditional or predictive power calculations, the probability of stopping at a given analysis, and the
unconditional power functions means that naive users often choose conditional or predictive power
thresholds that are suboptimal with respect to their treatment of scientific, ethical, and efficiency
issues, 3) conditional or predictive power alone, from a statistical foundations viewpoint, does not
address either frequentist or Bayesian optimality criteria, and 4) consideration of tradeoffs between
unconditional power and efficiency is sufficient to ensure adequate treatment of futility concerns.
In particular, we do not find any particular advantage in the adaptive redesign of a clinical trial
based on stochastic curtailment issues. Careful evaluation of stopping rules and information based
implementation procedures can handle most of the situations where uncertainty exists about the
imprecision of estimates of treatment effects.
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